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Abstract 
Measurements of the existence and extent of racially polarized voting are often 
at the forefront of the evidence presented in vote dilution litigation. Previous 
models used in the measurement of racially polarized voting have been inade­
quate for a broad range of cases. The source of this inadequacy is that these 
models were not based upon assumptions about individual behavior. 
A new model, which is based on reasonable assumptions about individual 
behavior and can be approximated by a varying parameters model, is derived. 
By contrasting the new model with the other models, it is shown that both the 
correlation coefficient and linear regression can lead to inaccurate, misleading 
or incorrect conclusions about the state of racial polarization in the electorate. 
After providing a straightforward statistical test for identifying misspecification 
and showing how to obtain estimates for this model by the method of maximium 
likelihood, the model is compared with an individual level data set of an election 
where racially polarized voting occurred (1988 California presidential primacy) .
A new measure for the estimation of racially polarized voting is then proposed. 
One of the most significant changes in the amended Voting Rights Act of 
1982 affected the type of evidence minority groups could use when attempting 
to overturn a vote-diluting electoral mechanism. Since then, the relevant legal 
standard of any action under the Act has been the "results test". 1 Under this 
standard, minority groups can support their vote dilution claims by proving 
the existence of racially polarized voting. Consequently, measurements of the 
existence and extent of racially polarized voting are often at the forefront of the 
evidence presented in vote dilution litigation. 2
It is our contention that the methods currently used to measure racially po­
larized voting can be inadequate, inaccurate, misleading or incorrect. These 
problems arise directly because these methods are utilized without any knowl­
edge of how they relate to the actual voting behavior of individuals in the 
electorate. In particular, the estimation of voting behavior from aggregate data 
requires more than the Pearson correlation coefficient and more than a multiple 
regression whose dependent variables describe only the size of minority groups. 
Unless ethnic identity is the only determinant of voting behavior, both of these 
methods can lead to statistical inferences which are inconsistent with the actual 
voting behavior of members of minority groups. 
Our goal in this article, then, is to provide the theoretical basis for developing 
a method of measuring racially polarized voting. This theoretical basis consists 
of assumptions on the behavior of the individual in the electorate, from which 
we utilize basic probability theory to derive a statistically estimable model. 
In the process, we utilize this model to examine previous measures of racially 
poiarized voting; and provide insight into how they relate to the voting behavior 
of individuals in the electorate. 
Specifically, we develop in this paper: 
1. The necessary conditions for estimation.
1Senate Report # 97-417, 97th Congress, Second Session 28 (1982), U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 1982,
pp. 177-205. 
2Among the most recent and/or prominent: Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 {1983), Thornberg v. Gingles, 
106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986), Smith v. Clinton, U.S. District Court (Arkansas) 1 Civil Action LRC 88...29 
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2. How to estimate racially polarized voting with this model.
3. How this model can be derived from basic probabilistic reasoning on the
nature of analyzing aggregate vote returns.
4. How this model can be approximated by a type of model known in the
statistical literature as the varying parameters model.
5. The exact correspondence between this model and the correlation coeffi­
cient in the determination of racially polarized voting.
6. What happens when the necessary conditions are violated in linear regres­
sion.
7. How we can use properties of the model to assess both its consistency and
the underlying assumptions that our model's use requires.
8. How to estimate this model.
9. A comparison of this model with an individual level data set on an election
where racially polarized voting takes place.
10. A new measure of racially polarized voting.
1 Necessary conditions for estimation. 
Consider an electorate consisting of g = 1, ... , G groups satisfying the partition 
condition. 3 
Partition condition: 
The groups must be defined so that they are mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive. (Each individual in one and only one
group.) 
8We appreciate the advice of Bruce Cain who has suggested the utility of partitioning the electorate in com­
munications with the authors. 
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A "group" could be one of the various ethnic or racial groups in the electorate, 
or a subdivision of such a group based on geographic and/or socioeconomic 
differences within an ethnic classification. Furthermore, let there be c = 1, .. . , C 
candidates running in a particular election for which members of this electorate 
vote. Let there be u = 1, .. . , U aggregated units for which members of each group 
g vote. For example, these "units" can be thought of as any electoral subdi­
vision, like voting precincts. Let the number of voters of group g in aggregate 
unit u be Xug· Then, if V is the total number of votes cast in this election, and 
Vu is the total number of votes cast in each electoral subdivision, we have, 
u=U 
v = L Vu where Vu= Xu1 + ... + XuG·
tt=l 
The model we present is based on the following simple condition: 
Homogeneity condition: 
Every individual member of group g = 1, ... , G votes with a prob­
ability Pgc for candidate c • This probability is independent of other 
voters' decisions and electoral unit. 
This condition states that when an individual is selected from a group, the 
probability of him voting for a candidate is the same as the probability of any 
other individual chosen from that group voting for the candidate. Thus an in­
dividual's behavior can be described, probabilistically, as a Bernoulli trial. The 
assumption of independence is no different than that made in survey analysis.• 
The homogeneity condition must be satisified for any model of group voting 
behavior, using correlation or regression techniques for estimation, to always 
be correct. A model not satisfying this condition is liable to serious misspecifi­
cation. This misspecification will be troubling, in the context of vote dilution 
4It is difficult to see how any method of the analysis of aggregate voting, which is based on a description of 
individual behavior, can be accepted without the utilization of some form of the homogeneity condition, for 
what it does is assign a probability law to the individual himself. Gary King has suggested in a communication 
with the authors that this assumption be relaxed somewhat by allowing the probability to be randomly 
distributed as well. For reasons which will become apparent in section 3 and 4 this is possible but if it is done 
much of the simplicity of our approach will be lost. We discuss this more in the conclusion. 
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litigation, since analysis with the misspecified model can lead to one of these 
two results, (Detailed in Section 6):
1. Existence of racially polarized voting established when, in fact, it does not
exist.
2. Non-existence of racially polarized voting established, when, in fact it does
exist.
2 How to estimate racially polarized voting with this
model 
It may seem that partioning the electorate into different groups would make it 
impossible to determine the voting behavior of a broad group which consists 
of two or more partitioned subgroups, but this is not the case. In general, 
it is true that there will not be a "single" probability for a group as broad 
as "blacks" or "hispanics" . However, there is a straight-forward method of 
obtaining a single probability for this type of group. The method is the same 
as that used in public opinion polls. First, calculate the sum of the obtained 
probabilities for each subgroup, weighting each probability by the number of 
voters within the partition. Then normalize this figure, dividing the weighted 
sum by the total number of voters in all of the partitioned groups. This gives 
us the single probability for the broad group, which is needed for questions of 
racial polarization. 
We want a model which satisfies the homogeneity and partition conditions. There 
always exists a finite set of divisions of the electorate which satisfy the partition 
condition, for at an extreme we can create groups with one person in each, 
which would give mutual exclusivity and collective exhaustion. 5 When these 
conditions are satisfied we proceed to the estimation of the voting behavior of 
50f course, this much reduction wouid not permit the model to be estimated. We might mention at this point 
that while verification of the partition condition is relatively straightforward, verification of the homogeneity 
condition is more difficult. In Section 7, we provide a statistical test which will provide e'\':idence on whether 
the conditions of the model are satisfied. 
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a particular ethnic group. 
We can always divide an ethnic group, E, into relevant mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive subgroups in order to analyze voting behavior. 6 
After verifying the satisfaction of the partition and homogeneity conditions, 
we estimate the probability that an individual in each subgroup will vote for 
candidate c ( c = 1, . . .  , c). We desire an estimate of the probability that a
randomly selected member of ethnic group E will vote for candidate c. To do 
this we sum the individual probabilities in the manner described above, which 
gives the expected vote for candidate c from ethnic group E. 
If there are G groups in the electorate, where groups 1 through l are mutually 
exclusive, collectively exhaustive subgroups of ethnic group E, then we have 
Subgroups of E 
Ve= X1Pc1 + X2Pc2 + · · · + XePce +Xe+iPce+i + · · · + XaPcG· 
Our estimate for the probability that a member of ethnic group E votes for 
candidate c is thus: 
If the probabilities are random (as will be the case when the model is sta­
tistically estimated) , we can use a straight-forward application of probability
theory to determine the standard error of this probability. 
3 The basic probabilistic framework
Using the homogeneity condition, it is a simple exercise in probability theory to 
note that, by the binomial theorem, if we have Xug individuals that are members 
of group g in election unit u, the probability of K of them voting for candidate 
c, Pr(Kugc = k), is simply,
5For exarnple, within ethnic group E there are differences in income, education1 age, etc., all of which may 
have some effect on the (heterogeneity) homogeneity of the voting behavior of the ethnic group. 
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P (K _ k) _ ( Xug ) k ( )x,,-kr ugc - - k Peg 1 - Peg · (1) 
Thus, the probability that candidate c will recieve Vue votes from election 
unit u, Pr( Vue= Ku1c +· · · + Kuac) is
G-1 
Pr(KuGc = Xua - L £,,,)
m=l 
Ill .. ·Ill '--v---' 
G - 2 times 
which equals 
(2) 
( By convention, if 4 >Xu; we set the probability equal to zero.) 
This is a formidable expression but there is a relatively good way of approx-
imating it, as we show in the next section. 
4 An approximation with the varying parameters model
It is shown in elementary textbooks in probability 7 that the cumulative distri­
bution function of the binomial distribution may be approximated by that of 
7Feller, William, An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications: Volume I, (New York, 1950)
6 
the normal c.d.f .. This suggests: 
Define • to be a normal variable, 8 
<uge � n ( 0, Pge {1- Pye) ) = n (0, Age) .
Then we express Kuge as, 
Kugc 
• 
XugPgc + XJg €ugc• 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Implying directly that the probability of (Vue 
approximated by, 
Kulc + · · · + Kuae) can be 
Pr( Vue = 
or, collecting terms, 
·� ·� ) Xu1Plc + Xu! €u1c + ... + XuaPGc + xuG €uGc '
Pr( Vue
(6) 
(7) 
where X, p and • are now vectors and Yu is the vector consisting of the x�£2, g = 
1, ... , G  . . This is a variant of a varying parameters model.9 Note that this formu­
lation shows that linear regression is a consistent (though not efficient) method 
of estimation. 
Since 
we have, 
v - \ 
.1 ucuc /l (8) 
(9) 
8This approximation is considered to be excellent when XugPgc � 5 and Xu9(1 - Puc) � 5. It is often quite
good for smaller values. It is clear, by the construction of the error structure in this model, that the error 
terms are independent of each other and the variables Xug 
9See Gregory C. Chow, "Random and Changing Coefficient Models" iri Handbook of Econometrics: Volume 2, 
{�A ..msterdam, 1984), pp. 1214 = 1224. and P. lL V. B. Sw<i.my, Stati3ticaJ !r,,ference inJW.r..dom Coeffic:"er.t Regre::sion 
Models, (New York, 1971)
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Pr(Vuc - XuPc) = 
where Ac= [>.i" . .. , >.ac]· 
The product of these probabilities for the individual observations gives us 
the likelihood. We then utilize the method of maximum likelihood to obtain 
estimates of the unknown parameters Pie, . . .  , Pac, >.ic, . . .  , >.ac· 
5 The correspondence between this model and the cor­
relation coefficient. 
We now look at the correspondence between this model and the correlation co­
efficient in the case where there exist two groups that satisfy the homogeneity 
and partition conditions. The correlation coefficient is a measure of the rela­
tionship between the proportion of the total vote recieved by a candidate c, Ve, 
and the proportion of the population who are members of a particular group, 
x. (one such group could be "hispanic" voters) . The true equation for Ve, as
the sum of the expected vote percentage of all groups in the electorate, is: 
Orie problem with the correlation coefficient is that its val-ue deper1ds riot 
only on the propensity of a particular group to vote for a particular candidate 
but also on factors which may have little or nothing to do with the issue of 
voting polarization. Given the true formulation of the vote for candidate c 
above, we derive in Appendix A that the correlation coefficent is actually, 
Corr(V. X ) = Pie - P2c C) 1 1/2' [(Pie - P2c)2 + aiPic(l - Pie)+ a2P2c(l - P2c)] 
E(Xl) where a; = V ( ) 
.ar xi 
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Thus, while the correlation coefficient is increasing as the difference between 
Pie and P2c increases 10, the actual relation between Corr( Ve, X1) and Pie is non­
linear and dependent upon the moments of X1 and X2• Stated less elegantly, 
when Pie or p2c changes, the resulting value of Corr( Ve, X1) will not, in general,
reflect the magnitude of the change. Furthermore, the magnitude of the cor­
relation coefficient will not accurately reflect the magnitude of the difference 
between Pie and P2c. 
In Appendix B, we give an example of how misleading the correlation coeffi­
cient can be. We look at the case where Pie = .5 and P2c = 0. We show that Corr
(Xi, V1) can take values of between 0 and .65, depending on the variance of x,. 
Thus, it is possible to have a correlation coefficient which tells of "significant 
racial polarization" when in fact a majority of neither group supported the candidate
in question. In cases where the homogeneity and partition conditions are not 
satisfied, interpreting the correlation coefficient will be even more problematic. 
Grofman, Migalski and Noviello (1985) make the following comment about 
the correlation coefficient: 
"there has been no universally accepted threshhold at which polar­
ization would be regarded as statistically or substantively significant" 
but point out that the courts have accepted the standard that p ;::>: .5 implies 
that "statistically significant racial polarization" exists. 11 The preceeding argument
should make clear the danger of such interpretations of the correlation coef­
ficient. We assert that this section adds to previous findings which conclude 
that the correlation coefficient should no longer be considered as a reasonable 
method of estimation for voting rights litigation.12
10It requires some algebra, but differentiate the expression with respect to p1, It can be shown that for any
fixed value of P2c, as Plc increases so does Corr( Ve, X1).
11Grofman, Bernard, Michael Migalski and Nicholas Noivello, "The Totality of Circumstances" test in Section 
2 of the 1982 Extention of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective", Law and Policy, Vol. 1, 
Number 2 (1985), pp. 199M223. Quote is on page 203. 
12Engstrom, Richard L. and Michael D. MacDonald "Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation, Part 
II: Minority Coalitions and Multivariate Analyses", Urban Lawyer, Winter 1981, Vol. 19 # 11 p. 65 -75. It
is shown in this article that the correlation coefficient should not be used when "more than two minority 
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6 Violation of assumptions in linear regression.
We now directly assess the consequences of using linear regression to estimate 
racially polarized voting when the homogeneity and/or partition conditions are 
violated. We begin by constructing two simplified electorates. Each electorate 
consists of 100 voters (alternatively, the number of voters can be thought of as 
the percent of voters in an electorate of size N), and is split into four subdivisions 
(precincts) of 25 voters each. 
Consider Electorates U and V, detailed in Figure 1, and suppose that the 
only two factors which affect the voting decision of an individual are E, a racial 
(or ethnic) classification, and I, a socioeconomic (or geographic) classification. 
Furthermore, suppose that individuals can easily be placed into one of two 
categories within each classification. [ E = (E1, E2) and I = (I1,I2)]. 13 Thus, 
each voter can be described by membership in one (and only one) of these four 
groups: [E1I1, E1I2, E2I1, E2I2]. Geographic segregation by factors E and I exists 
in both electorates to different degrees. 
The electorates are divided into four electoral units of equal size. The pro­
portion of each group within electoral units 1 - 4, (zi, z2, z3, z4), varies across 
electoral units within each electorate. The shadings within the electoral units 
are proportional to the number of each group within that electoral unit. The 
distributions (among units) of the four groups in the four electoral units are 
represented graphically and numerically in Figure 1. 
Pgc gives the probability that a member of group g will vote for candidate c.
By looking at the table in Figure 1, you can verify that, in Electorate U, Pgc is
groups" are present as the resulting coefficients may be "systematically biased" 1 depending on the covariance 
of the dependent variables. What we show here extends this result to the case of two groups, even if 
the groups satisfy our conditions. In addition, Grofman1 Migalski and Noviello have advocated the use of 
ecological regression techniques in a series of articles including "Effects of Multimember Districts on Black 
Representation in State Legislatures1 , The Review of Black Political Economy, (1986), Vol. 14, Number 4, pp. 66-
78. and the article referenced in the previous footnote. Among published work surveying estimation methods
for racial polarization are Charles S. Bullock, III and Susan A. MacManus, 11Measuring Racial Bloc Voting is 
Difficult for Small Jurisdictions", National Civic Review, July/ August, 1984
13These suppositions are made only to simplify the example. They are net conditions en which the general 
results depend. 
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I 
I-
Electorate U Electorate V 
Electorate U Electorate V 
Grou12 Pattern 
c::::J 
I>:-:· >I 
-
111111111111111 
Grou12 Name 
E 1 I 1
E 1 I 2
E 2 I 1
E2 I 2
Pct of Electorate 
20 
40 
10 
30 
P(gc) Pct of Electorate P(gc)
.9 40 .3 
.3 20 .2 
.9 15 1.0 
.3 25 .6 
P(gc) is the probability of support for candidate c by a member of group g.
Grou,..., Disl!ibutions within electoral units. 
Group Electorate U Electorate V 
�'--- zi z2 z3 l\JUI 11� z4 zl z2 z3 z4 
E 1 11 .12 .16 .20 .32 .72 .68 .08 .12 
E 1 I 2 .60 .52 .32 .16 .00 .00 .44 .36 
E2 I 1 .00 .08 .24 .08 .28 .24 .08 .00 
E2 I 2 .28 .24 .24 .44 .00 .08 .40 .52 
Figure 1 Description of the sample electorates. 
determined entirely by factor I. In Electorate V, both factors are determinants 
of Pgc· 
In Table 1, we compare three estimates of the effect of group membership on 
voting behavior. The first model is an exit poll, which asks each person not only 
who they voted for but also with which group are they a member. If proper 
sampling techniques are used, we directly obtain the desired relationship. The 
second and third models are linear regression models which have already been 
proposed as measures of racially polarized voting, but which violate either the 
partition or homogeneity conditions. 14 
Table 1 - VARIOUS MODELS 
SAMPLE ELECTORATE 
Model 1 (Exit Poll) 
El 
E2 
I1 
I, 
Estimation from Model 2: 
El 
Ez 
Estimation from :rdodel 3: 
Ez 
I2 
Constant 
Electorate U 
.50 
.45 
.90 
.30 
V1 = /'1 El + f32E2 
.19 
.91 
Vi = et.1E2 + et.2!2 
.00 
-.60 
22.5 
Electorate V 
.27 
.75 
.49 
.37 
(Violates Homogeneity) 
.59 
.26 
(Violates Partition) 
.16 
-.20 
12.1 
15 
14In electorates more complex than U and V, the problems we expose will be many orders of magnitude greater. 
16The constant term is omitted from the estimation of Model 2 as the dependent variables are mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive. A constant term is included in the estimation of Model 3 as the right hand side 
variables do not account for every individual in the electorate. Variances and covariances between the groups 
are provided at the beginning of the appendix. 
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A comparison of the estimates from Models 2 and 3 with the results of the 
exit poll (Model 1) exemplify the type of problem arises when the homogeneity 
and partition conditions are violated. 
Let us first look at Model 2, V1 = (31E1 + (32E2 + u ,which is suggested in
Engstrom and McDonald (1987). 16 This line of reasoning also applies to
the ecological regression method suggested in Grofman, Migalski and Noviello 
(1985) as it is possible that neither satisifies the homogeneity condition. 17 
According to the exit poll, 50 % of E1 and 45 % of E2 support candidate c in 
Electorate U. The coefficients from the regression using Model 2 gives evidence 
of substantial racial polarization in Electorate U, (f31 = .19, (32 = .91), the wrong 
result given that E has no effect on P.c, the individual's voting decision in
that electorate. In Electorate V, 27 % of E1 and 75 % of E2 actually support 
candidate c. The use of Model 2 leads to the conclusion that E1 is much more 
supportive of candidate c than E2, again clearly the wrong result. When using 
Model 2, we omit the effect of the factor I on the vote V<> which is the cause of 
severe misspecification. This misspecification occurs because it is not the case 
that every member of ethnic group E1 (or E2) votes for candidate c with equal 
probability (i.e., P(E,I,c) is not equal to P(E,I,c). 
Model 3, Ve = a1E2 + a2I2, suggested by the U.S. in Thornberg v. Gingles, 
may not satisfy the partition condition. 18 This model makes it difficult, if
not impossible, to model the behavior of individuals within a group since one 
16Their model is a simple linear regression. Notice that, intuitively, we can make the homogeneity assump­
tion operational in this model by setting the probability of voting for candidate c in group E1l1 equal to
the probability of voting for c in group E1I2, resulting in both probabilities equalling f31. A more formai 
operationalization of this model will follow. 
17In the example on pp.204-205, the partition condition is satisfied for blacks and whites, as the electorate by 
race and " "race voted for", thus capturing the underlying electoral behavior of each group. Whether or 
not this model also satisfies the homogeneity condition depends on whether the behavior of the minority is 
homogeneous. Grofman et. al., incidentally, recognize the possibility of misspecification in their estimations 
and suggest looking at voting units which are racially homogenous to avoid the possibility of the "ecological 
fallacy" ,  which is the rather unfortunate term attached to misspecification in aggregate data analysis. This 
does not preclude, of course, the possibility of different behavior among members of a racial minority in a 
homogeneous voting unit (as opposed to members of a non-homogeneous voting unit).
18In the context of the examples above. Changing the subscripts of E and I give the other representations of 
this model. 
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person can easily fit into multiple categories. 19 This occurrence will lead to a
constant term and coefficients whose interpretations are not obvious, as can be 
gathered from the results above. 
A problem which both Model 2 and Model 3 share is specification error. A 
brief explanation will expose the problem. The true equation, which gives us 
estimates of racial voting polarization is 
where g = 1, . . .  , G are the partitions of the electorate. In regression analysis, Pye
is represented by f3ge· We estimate the vector of f3.e, f3 by /3, where Ve= Xf3 and
By violating the partition or homogeneity conditions, the actual partitions 
(the x, 's) are replaced by another set of variables, (z, 's). To estimate the
relation between Ve and Z, we must, necessarily replace the vector of coefficients 
f3 by a vector r, which we estimate by 'f. r can be statistically sound, but it is no 
longer representative of the effect of race on the vote for a particular candidate. 
Consider the expected value of r : 
Recall that f3 is the true value of the vector of the P�es. The expected value 
of 'f does not equal (3. Furthermore, any covariance between Z and X that is
not accounted for in the formulation of the Z's will cause r to be different than 
{!, in ways which we may not be able to account for. 
Given that the homogeneity and partition conditions are satisfied, and the 
type of problem just discussed does not occur, we proceed with a further exami­
nation of the situation presented in Engstrom and MacDonald (1987). They are 
interested in the case where there are multiple ethnic groups and propose an or­
dinary least squares method of regression to estimate coefficients for each of the 
ethnic groups (blacks, latinos and whites). Their dependent variable, "number 
of votes for candidate 1" will be represented as V1• Their dependent variables 
19For instance, one person can be Hispanic, and middle-class and have a high school diploma simultaneously. 
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are L, number of latinos and B, number of blacks. The "number of whites" 
variable is not used as a dependent variable, the coefficient for this group is 
given by the constant term in the equation. The equation they propose is as 
follows: 
V, = ao + a,L+ a2B. 
Where a0, the constant term, is actually, a0 = a0(L+B+W) (expressing things
in terms of proportions, thus the sum of all the groups in the electorate is one) .
This gives: 
Vi= ao(L + B + W) + a1L + a2B 
Vi = aoW +(a,+ ao)L + (a2 + ao)B. 
If dividing the electorate into blacks, latinos and whites satisifies the partition 
condition, the true equation for this situation looks like this: 
V, = poW + p,L + p2B. 
Thus we get the following equalities, 
ao =Po, 
a1 =p1 -po, et2=p2-Po· 
Thus, under the regression method proposed by Engstrom and MacDonald, 
what is being estimated is not the voting behavior of a particluar ethnic group 
but the voting behavior of one group relative to that of another. 20 
A benefit of the model proposed in this paper is that its basis is the true 
equation and the coefficients, (30, (31 and (32 are obtained directly from the esti­
mation. Thus our coefficients now give us the magnitude of each group's voting 
polarization, from which we can easily derive the relative magnitudes given in 
the Engstrom and MacDonald coefficients. 21 It is fairly straightforward to
20A 5imil<i.r �rgument is derived in Grofman, Miga!ski and Noviello (1985)�
21Consider an example where a1 = .3. We have shown that this represents the difference in the voting behaviors 
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extend this model to cases of three or more racial groups as long as the sub­
groups whose coefficents are estimated satisfy the homogeneity and partition 
conditions. 
7 Assessing the Consistency of the Model
One benefit of this model is that it provides a straightforward statistical test 
for identifying misspecification. The binomial distribution is a one-parameter 
member of the exponential family, so once we know the location parameter value 
(call it p), we also know the variance (which is p(l-p)). From maximum likeli­
hood theory, we know that minus the inverse of second partial derivatives with 
respect to the parameters (i.e. the information matrix) will give us the asymp­
totic variance. We can then construct a Wald test for a misspecified model. 22
In examples of racially polarized voting, this can be caused by the exclusion of 
factors which do affect the voting decision, but are not distributed randomly 
across race, and usually lead to a violation of the homogeneity condition (i. e. 
income, education, age). 23 The only remedy for such misspecification that we
can offer at the moment, within the context of our model, is to further subdivide 
the electorate into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups which 
account for these "excluded factors" as well as ethnicity. 
For construction of the Wald test, we simply take 
( ).�1 -P1(1-P1) 
\I ( J.�1 -Pi (1 -P1) 
\ 
I " o" " I I 
2 � 
l ) 
lEl�e:1-1j l 
)·
X(a) A
>-."a -Pa(l - Pa) >-."a -pa(l - pa) 
where the matrix in the middle is the information matrix for the variance pa-
of groups 0 (whites) and group 1 (latinos). In vote dilution cases, it is important to know whether this value
represents the difference between .0 and .3 or the difference between .35 and .65. 
22Wald, A. "Tests of Statistical Hypotheses Concerning Several Parameters When the Number of Observations 
Is Large", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 54, pp. 426-482. 
28It can also be caused by an incorrect assignment of individuals into their correct partition, but that is a 
problen1 which can be investigate through non-statistical 1neans. If this occurs, however, it should cause a 
high Wald and a rejection of the model, also. 
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rameters. 24 
The value from this test is used then to determine the outcome of a hypothesis 
test where the critical value is determined by a chi - squared distribution with 
degrees of freedom G. It is also possible to derive a likelihood ratio test which 
will be asympototically equivalent to the Wald test. In that case the restricted 
maximization would set each estimated variance parameter equal to the product 
of the estimated probability parameter and one minus that parameter, and the 
usual likelihood ratio test would be performed. 
8 How to estimate this model. 
To obtain estimates for this model by the method of maximum likelihood, it is 
necessary to maximize the value of the likelihood function (derived in Section
4) over the parameter space. The parameter space for the model is defined as
follows: the probability parameters for the individual groups fall between zero 
and one and the variance parameters are greater than zero. Maximum likelihood 
estimation can take place either utilizing a search model or a modified Newton­
Ralphson algorithm. 
One search algorithm which is convienent for most social science researchers 
is contained in SPSSX. The constrained nonlinear regression procedure can be 
utilized to perform the maximization of a likelihood function, including the 
likelihood for this model. An example of this is provided in Appendix C. Our 
experier1ce witl1 tl1is is tl1at it utilizes a trerr1er1dous a:r11011r1t of co1r1puter tirr1e, 
but in these days of declining cpu costs this is probably not an overriding 
consideration. 
The likelihood can also be maximized by using a Newton-Raphson procedure. 
To do this, we calculate the matrix of the second partials of the log of the 
241t is also possible to construct Wald tests for the probability parameters and the overall model, using the 
appropriate submatrices of the information matrix, and we utilize those later on in our empirical testing 
section. 
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likelihood, 25 and obtain a matrix where the (j ,£)'h element in the matrix is:
(j, £) = 
_ "u x.;x., [-' _ {V."-x.v)' ] "f · ' G L.,,u=l � 2 Uu l J, t..> '
if j, £ :'> G, 
if j :'> G, £ > G, 
if£ :'> G, j > G . 
The inverse of the expectation of this is simply 
[-(z1
0
zi-1 o ] 
-2(W'W)-1 '
where Zu = >f,1+2 and Wu = b, for au> 0 ..Uu Uu 
This expectation is negative definite if the X' X matrix is of full rank and if 
au> O for all u, which suggests that the use of the Newton-Ralphson algorithm
would probably give good results in maximizing the likelihood. The problem 
is that while the expectation of the inverse of the matrix of second partials 
is certainly negative definite at the true value of the parameters, neither the 
inverse of the matrix of second partials, nor its expectation, will in general be 
negative definite throughout the parameter space. There are several methods 
which are commonly used to handle this problem. One which we used in our 
programming was to modify the step size, so that the full Newton-Ralphson 
step was not taken when large changes in the coefficients where indicated by the 
algorithm (rather, a half-step or fourth-step was taken) . We also used "good"
starting estimates (generally the least square estimates) for our procedure.
25Here the probabilities are the first G parameters and the variance parameters are the last G. We also use this 
matrix to derive the information matrix. 
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9 Comparing this model with an individual level data
set 
Our estimatation was done with census tract level data for Los Angeles County, 
California for the June 1988 presidential primary election. 26 We subdivided
the latino and white populations by whether or not they lived in areas that 
were at least 50 % black. Running the Newton-Ralphson algorithm without 
this subdivision caused the model to fail to converge. 
To compare our estimates with individual level estimates, we examined data 
from an exit poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times on the day of the 1988 
Democratic presidential primary. There are 4, 705 respondents from the state of 
California. We examined the subset of 2,193 respondents who said they voted 
in the Democratic primary. The ethnic breakdown of the candidates' support 
are provided in the regression results which follow. 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression with dependent variable "Votes 
for Jackson". 
26Census tracts (with average population about 4000) are likely to be too large a unit of aggregation to expect
to be able to satisfy the homogeniety conditions. They do allow the testing of our model in a radaHy polarized
election. 
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Table 2 - SUPPORT FOR JACKSON
1988 California Primary LA TIMES LA County Std. Errors 
(LA County) 
COEFFICIEN·rs 
BLACK .938 .943 .0037 
ASIAN .448 .590 .0160 
LATINO .433 .388 .1852 
- living in black areas n .720 .0102 
- living in non-black areas n .289 .0016 
WHITE .293 .189 .1836 
- living in black areas n .257 .0042 
- living in non-black areas n .178 .0005 
VARIANCES 
BLACK n .77 .1482 
ASIAN n 11.84 19.9082 
LATINO n 1.30 .8571 
- living in black areas n 1.39 .8661 
- living in non-black areas n 1.28 .2730 
WHITE I n 4.86 2.3704 I 
- living in black areas n 16.92 34.9162 
- living in non-black areas n 2.81 .0475 
Overall Wald for model n 97041.13 
Wald for location parameters n 96273.68 
Wald for variance parameters n 694.81 
n = not applicable or available for this type of data
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Table 2 demonstrates several things about the model. First, the hypothesis 
of the estimated variances equalling the expected variances is rejected at any 
level of signifigance by the Wald test, as might be expected with comparing the 
estimation of the variance parameters from the model with the theoretical val­
ues, pg(l-pg ) . Of interest, however, is the fact that the estimated probabilities
are very close to the exit poll (which was a statewide poll, whereas our estimates
are for LA County only) . One likely problem with our specification is that we 
utilized the ratio of the various ethnic and racial groups in the population for 
our creation of the partitions-thus our partitions are doubtlessly in error. 27
It is obvious a great deal of work needs to be done on how the model behaves 
when there is mispecification, because in some sense this model clearly is "good" 
when compared with the Los Angeles Times exit poll. 
10 How to use this measure to assess racially polarized 
voting. 
We conclude by proposing a new measure for the estimation of racially polarized 
voting, based on what has been developed here. Ideally, the measure we propose 
is one which: 
1. satisifies the partition condition, (Section 1.)
2. is not statistically rejected when the homogeneity condition is tested, (Sec­
tior1s 1 arid 7)
3. gives a coefficient for each racial or ethnic group by summing over all of
the partitioned subdivisions of the electorate which that group includes,
(Section 2)
4. and is used in conjunction with the conditions set out by Justice Brennan
in Thornberg v. Gingles (1986) 28 or similar conditions which determine
27 Also, Los Angeles County, which has a large number of aliens in its heavily Latino areas, would by this 
method of creating partitions have too high a proportion of Latino voters. This is probably the reason that 
the model failed to converge when the Latinos and whites were not split by black areas. 
28106 S.Ct. 2767: 
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whether or not an electoral system complies with the amended Voting 
Rights Act. 29
Given a correct measure, the Congress may want to consider mandating a 
procedure for vote dilution cases which in some way recognizes the importance 
of the probability estimates by the various groups for the various candidates 
(i.e., PE,c - PE,c, as derived in Section 2, where E1 and E2 are different ethnic or
racial groups and Puc is the voting tendency of the specified group.) 
11 Conclusion 
Where previous Voting Rights cases have tended to congregate in the bi-racial 
South, the most recent cases involve multi-racial metropolitan areas in the 
northeast and southwest parts of the country. This movement will undoubt­
edly be the cause of much disagreement in the correct way to measure voting 
polarization. We have proposed a method which should address most of the 
controversies head on. While we have pointed out problems with estimation 
methods previously used and have proposed the homogeneity and partition 
conditions as necessary conditions for correct estimation, our conclusion is not 
that all previous estimation is flawed. Consider the voting rights cases of the 
South, where the electoral behavior of blacks and whites in races where some 
of the candidates were black was given special attention. In those situations, it 
is more than likely that the necessary conditions were satisfied. 
The real concern here is for present and future estimation where the iden­
tification of group voting behavior is not so clear. In contemporary America, 
it cannot be taken for granted that all members of a protected minority group 
• The minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single member district.
• The minority group must show that it is politically cohesive.
• The minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
usually to defeat the minority preferred candidate.
29This concept has been worked with most extensively in Grofman, Migalski and Noviello (1985).
21 
have the same electoral preferences. Estimates of group voting behavior based 
on such an assumption, ignoring the homogeneity condition, will be of question­
able validity. These estimates will ignore the fact that voting decisions are made 
by individuals, and individual behavior cannot necessarily be modelled through 
ethnic variables alone. We have offered a method which allows a determination 
of what categorizations are sufficient. 
We have shown that this measure is one which is based upon an intuitively 
plausible assumption about individual behavior, with probablistic reasoning 
being applied to derive conditions which aggregate estimates must satisfy. We 
have also seen, in our empirical example, that our method of estimating provides 
fairly accurate results even when the conditions we have set forth are violated. 
Further research is obviously needed to understand exactly what conditions this 
can happen under. In any case, we remain confident that the theoretical un­
derpinnings of our method are sound and that any other model which purports 
to measure racial polarization in an electorate must also be based upon the 
behavior of individuals in that electorate. In particular, the correlation coeffi­
cient has clearly been shown to be deficient and should no longer be used. In 
addition, regression methods should not be used without examination under 
our probabilistic framework. 
We quite honestly believe that further work needs to be done on this model 
before we would recommend it as being accepted as the one and only method 
of determining racially polarized voting. (One possible extention, suggested
by Gary King, would be to allow the probabilities to be randomly distributed, 
perhaps through the use of a beta distribution.) We do believe that all future
analyses utilizing regression should be estimated with this model, as well as 
with regression. And it is clear, also, that a probabilistic framework of the type 
we have set up, with the emphasis on deriving aggregate methods of analysis 
from assumptions on the behavior of individuals, is in the long run the only type 
of framework that is defensible, either in a courtroom or in scholarly research. 
The establishment of racially polarized voting must, in the final analyses, be 
based on the voting behavior of individuals of that minority. 
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APPENDIX ELECTORATES IN GREATER DETAIL
SAMPLE ELECTORATE Electorate U Electorate V 
Covariances 
Eil1 , Ei -4.25 18.75 
Eili , E2 4.25 -18.75 
Eili , 12 -4.50 -77.00 
Eil2 , Ei 10.75 -12.25 
Eil2 , E2 -10.75 12.25 
Eil2 , 12 12.25 51.00 
E2l1 , Ei -3.50 7.25 
E21i , E2 3.50 -7.25 
E2l1 , 12 -5.75 -28.69 
E2l2 , E, -3.00 -13.75 
E2l2 , E2 3.00 13.75 
E2l2 , I2 -2.00 54.69 
Variances 
E, 6.50 6.5 
E2 6.50 6.5 
I2 10.25 105.7 
A DeI·ivatio11 of the cor1�elation coefficient when homo-
geneity condition is satisified. 
We assume that X1+X2 = 1, E(<i) = o, E(<2) = O and that <i and <2 are independent
of each other, X1 and X2• 
By the definition of the correlation coefficient, 
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Cov(Xi, Vi) 
Corr( Xi, V.) = 
[Var(X1)Var(V.)]1/2 ·
The vote for candidate 1 is defined as: 
V1 X1(P1 + <i) + X2(P2 + <2) 
Which gives, 
Var(V.) = Var(X1P1 + X2P2) + Var(X1<1 + X2<2), 
since Cov(X1p1 + X2pz, X1<1 + X2<2) = o, and, 
Var(X1<1 + X2<2) = Var(X1<1) + Var(X2<2), 
since we assume Cov(Xi<i, X2<2) = o. From the definition of variance, we have, 
Var(X1<i) = E(Xf)E(<i) - [E(X1)]2[E(<1)]2,
E(xnE!•fl, 
Var(X2<2) 
and 
Var(X1P1 + X2p2) 
E(X�)E(<§), 
piVar(X1) + p§Var(X2) + 2p1p2Cov(Xi, X2). 
We also know that 
and 
Now, 
Var(X1) = Var(l - X2) = Var(-X2) = Var(X2), 
Cov(X1,X2) = Cov(X1, (1- X1)) = -Var(X1). 
Cov(X1, V1) = Cov(X1,X1p1 +X2p2 +X1<1 +X2<2), 
Cov(X1, X1p1 + X2p2), 
(since Cov(X1, X1<1 + X2<2) = O)
Cov(Xi, X,p, + (1 - X1)P2),
= Cov(X1,X1(P1 - P2) + P2), 
(p, - P2)Cov(X1, x,), 
(P1 - P2)Var(X,). 
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We now have all of the component parts of the correlation coefficient in terms 
of p;, x. and "' which we substitute into the definition,
Corr(X,, Vi) 
Corr(Xi, VI) = 
(PI -P2)Var(XI)
[Var(Xi)]'/2 [(PI -p2)2Var(XI) + E(Xf)E(•�) + E(.Ki)E(•5)]
If•
(PI -P2) 
[ 
] I 2 
2 + E(x1) E 2 + E(x5J E 2 (PI -P2) Var(x.) (•,) Var(x,J (€, ) 
If our assumption of homogeneity is satisfied, from the derivation in section 
3, we have 
Then 
E(•�) p1(1-pi), and
E(•�) P2(l-p2). 
E(Xf) _ E(X?) _ Let Var(XI) - a, 
and Var(X2) - a •. 
Corr(X,, VI) = 
(PI -P•) .
[(PI -P2J2 + aiPI(l -pi)+ a2P2(l -P2)]1/2
Note that this derivation depends completely upon assumptions of our model 
being satisfied-otherwise, the covariance terms are not zero and they must be 
included in the express10n. In addition, notice that if our assumptions are 
satisfied: 
Cov(X1, V1) _ _ 
Var(X1) 
=Pie -P2c-
B An exarnple of the range of possible values that the 
correlation coefficient can produce. 
Let p2 = O , then,
Corr(X,, VI)= ' - PI .. 1 /o' 
IP1 + aip1(l- PIJr'-
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Dividing through by p1 gives us: 
Let P1 = .5 , then, 
1 Corr(X1, V,) = 112 • 
[ 1 + a1 (l;;.i J 
1Corr(X1, V1) = 
( )1/2•1 + a1 
E(Xl) E(X?) 1 a1 = Var(X?) = E(P,) -[E(X1))2 
= 
1- 11i,f(x'/j' 
To estimate the possible range of the correlation coefficient we need to know 
some bounds on a1• X1 is a proportion (as defined in Section 5) so we know X1 
is between zero and one. Thus, we have, 
E(Xl) :<:; E(X1) :<:; 1 and E(Xfl � [E(X1)]2,
where the last relation is by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Then, 
E(Xl) :<:; E(X1) :<:; [E(X�)j1/2•
Let E(Xl) = .25. Then the above implies, 
which implies, 
and 
.25 :<:; E(X1) :<:; .5 ,
.0625 :<:; [E(Xi)J2 :<:; .25
1 > [E(X1)]
2 > �
- E(X?) - 4·
Plugging in to the equation for the correlation coefficient derived above we get: 
o :<:; Corr(Xi, V1) :<:; .65.
Similarly, letting E(Xl) = .64 implies o :<:; Corr(X1, V,) :<:; .625.
In this case we show that the correlation coefficient can be as high as .65, 
which some consider to be evidence of significant polarization, when a majority 
of neither group supports the candidate in question. It should be evident that 
a range of values of p1,p2 and the moments of X \Vill produce similar troubling
results. 
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C Estimation Program 
With the statistical program, SPSS-X (Version 3.0 is what we used) we can esti­
mate the varying parameters model using the constrained non-linear regression 
function. Below is a version of the SPSS-X command file needed for estima­
tion. The "comment" statements are included to help the reader keep track of 
our variable names and what our intention is at each stage. Our space restric­
tions will lead the interested reader to examine the SPSS-X manual for further 
information. 
file handle insys/name='rbv_p88.sys' 
comment 
This is the name of the input file. 
get f ile=insys/ 
comment 
The unit of observation is the voting precinct or a census tract. 
Since we are looking at a (Democratic presidential, Los Angeles 
County, 1988) primary, we break this electorate down into the 
relevant ethnic and racial categories using election returns and 
census data. 
(nblack number of blacks) 
(demvot number of voters participating in Democratic primary) 
(totvot number of voters on primary day) 
compute black demvot/totvot • nblack 
compute latino demvot/totvot * nlatino 
compute amerind demvot/totvot * namerind 
compute asian demvot/totvot * nasian 
compute other demvot/totvot * nether 
compute white demvot/totvot * nwhi te 
conunent 
When using the constrained non-linear regession method, initial 
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estimates of the support of the racial groups for a particular 
candidate are given with the model program command. This gives 
SPSS-X a starting point from where it can converge to the true 
values. From the binomial theorem, we can also give corresponding 
initial values for the variance of each parameter. 
(cblack initial estimate of black support for Dukakis) 
(sblack initial estimate variance of black support for Dukakis) 
(prsdm1$ � votes for Dukakis) 
model program 
cblack= . 01 clatino= . 50 camerind= . 50 casian= . 50 cother= . 50 
cwhite= . 70 sblack= . 099 slatino= . 25 samerind= . 25 sasian= . 25 
sother= . 25 swhite= . 21 
comment 
"Pred" gives the predicted value of the dependent variable (In our 
example, that is "Vote for Dukakis" or 11Vote for Jackson" ) .  "Loss" 
is equivalent to a loss function in maximum likelihood estimation , 
which is a representation of the difference between the predicted 
and actual values of the dependent variable. We get our estimates 
of racially polarized voting through SPSS-X's successive attempts 
to minimize this loss function. 
compute pred 
(black * cblack) + (latino • clatino) + (amerind * camerind) 
+ (asian • casian) + (other • cother) + (white * cwhite) 
compute loss= 
ln ( (black • sblack) + (latino • slatino) + (amerind • samerind) 
+ (asian * sasian) + (other * sother) + (white * swhite) ) 
+ ( (prsdm1$ - pred ) •  (prsdm1$ - pred) ) /  
(black • sblack) + (latino * slatino) + (amerind * samerind) 
+ (asian • sasian) + (other • sother) + (white • swhite) ) 
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comment 
11Cnlr11 is the constrained non-linear regression command . 11prsdm1$11 
(votes for Dukakis) is the dependent variable. Variables listed after 
"with" are the dependent variables. There is no constant term as the 
groups listed are collectively exhaustive of the electorate . The 
"bounds" subcommand, gives the necessary parameter limits. 
cnlr prsdm1$ with black latino amerind asian other white 
finish 
/bounds 
. 0001 < cblack < . 9999 
. 0001 < clatino < . 9999 
. 0001 < camerind < . 9999 
. 0001 < casian 
. 0001 < cother 
. 0001 < cwhite 
. 0001 < sblack
. 0001 < slatino 
. 0001 < samerind 
. 0001 < sasian 
. 0001 < sother 
. 0001 < swhite 
/loss= loss 
< . 9999 
< . 9999 
< . 9999 
/criteria steplimit . 0 1  
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